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ABSTRACT 
The extant literature on cross-national differences in approaches to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) has mostly focused on developed countries. Instead, we offer two inter-
related studies into corporate codes of conduct issued by developing country multinational 
enterprises (DMNEs). First, we analyse code adoption rates and code content through a mixed 
methods design. Second, we use multilevel analyses to examine country-level drivers of 
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differences in code content – specifically, elements of a country’s National Business System 
(NBS). We find that DMNEs are much more likely to adopt a code of conduct than their 
domestic counterparts; however, this does not translate into greater code comprehensiveness. We 
also find support for the ‘substitute view’ of CSR in developing countries, i.e. that MNEs from 
poorer countries and from countries with lower governance effectiveness tend to express more 
comprehensive commitments. However, this dynamic does not extend to a country’s labour 
system; instead, CSR appears here to match the efficiency of a country’s labour market, thus 
reflecting the ‘mirror view’ of CSR. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), the notion that companies have a responsibility for 
their impact on society beyond a narrow economic one, is spreading across the globe (Visser & 
Tolhurst, 2010). For example, codes of conduct – as one of the most widespread CSR tools – 
have been adopted by well over 90 per cent of the largest companies in major developed 
markets, such as the United States or the United Kingdom (KPMG, 2008; Wheldon & Webley, 
2013). At the same time, there is considerable heterogeneity in approaches to CSR between firms 
from different countries (Brammer & Pavelin, 2005). Explanations for such differences often 
suggest that the CSR priorities of firms are influenced by national-level institutions (Campbell, 
2007; Matten & Moon, 2008). In this respect, there is a debate in the literature whether CSR is a 
3 
 
 
‘substitute’ or a ‘mirror’ of national-level institutions, i.e. whether less robust institutions 
engender greater firm engagement in CSR or whether high quality institutions inspire firms to 
mirror these lofty standards (Brown & Knudsen, 2015; Koos, 2012). 
The overwhelming focus in cross-national studies into CSR has so far been on developed 
countries (Egri & Ralston, 2008). Where academic research has ventured into studying CSR in 
developing countries, such research has usually either analysed single countries (e.g., Muller & 
Kolk, 2009) or compared a small number of developed and developing countries (e.g., Melé, 
Debeljuh, & Arruda, 2006). By contrast, we are able to present data from two inter-related 
studies into the content of codes of conduct adopted by multinational enterprises (MNEs) from a 
wide range of developing countries. Our first study focuses on the level of the company and 
explores patterns regarding code adoption and code content across a sample of Forbes Global 
2000 firms from 18 developing countries. Our second study examines country-level drivers of 
differences in code content and uses the National Business Systems (NBS) and Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC)1 perspectives as a theoretical lens. The two studies thus address three inter-
related research questions: (1) are there differences in code adoption rates between developing 
country MNEs (DMNEs) and their domestic counterparts?; (2) what are the CSR priorities of 
DMNEs – as expressed in these codes (Study 1); and (3) how is code content shaped by the 
elements of their country’s National Business System (Study 2)? 
Our paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, in view of a relative 
lack of attention that has been given to CSR in developing countries as compared to developed 
ones (Egri & Ralston, 2008), we show that codes of conduct, as one prominent CSR tool, are 
increasingly being adopted by DMNEs, with countries like Brazil, South Africa and Thailand 
                                                     
1  While there are differences between the NBS and the VoC strands, we argue that, for the purposes of our paper, 
these two literature bodies can be considered as one theory stream. 
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coming close to code adoption rates in developed countries. Crucially, DMNEs are much more 
likely to adopt a code of conduct than are their domestic counterparts; however, this does not 
translate into differences in terms of code comprehensiveness. Second, we offer insights into the 
content of codes of conduct adopted by a sample of 179 MNEs from 18 developing countries in 
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Third, we provide evidence for 
the ways in which a country’s NBS impacts companies’ CSR-related commitments as expressed 
in their codes of conduct. In particular, we offer empirical support for the ‘substitute’ view of 
CSR in developing countries, i.e. that MNEs from poorer countries and from countries with 
lower governance effectiveness tend to express more comprehensive commitments in their codes 
of conduct. However, this ‘substitute effect’ does not appear to extend to the labour system; 
rather, here we identify a ‘mirror effect’, with the comprehensiveness of codes mirroring the 
level of labour market efficiency in a country. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The first section of Study 1 
summarizes the literature on CSR in developing countries, introduces the object of our study, the 
code of conduct, and presents a multi-dimensional framework to capture cross-national 
differences in CSR. Next, the research methods section details our sampling process and the 
statistical analyses we undertook in Study 1. Finally, the results section of Study 1 focuses on 
overarching patterns with regard to the adoption of codes as well as their content. In Study 2 we 
shift our attention to the context in which DMNEs operate, starting with an overview of the 
literature on National Business Systems (NBS) and Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) as a basis for 
drawing out national differences in the content of codes of conduct. After a brief presentation 
and justification of the research methods applied in this study, the results section tests a number 
of hypotheses regarding NBS/VoC drivers of differences between DMNEs in terms of code 
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content. In the discussion section, we then put forward the key findings emerging from both 
studies. Finally, the conclusions summarize the paper, outline some of its limitations and present 
avenues for future research. 
 
STUDY 1: INTERNATIONALISATION INFLUENCES ON DMNE CODE ADOPTION 
AND CONTENT 
CSR and Developing Countries 
CSR has been defined as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society” 
(European Commission, 2011, p. 6). As companies respond to the needs of the society they are 
embedded in, their CSR activities are likely to display a distinctly national flavour (Matten & 
Moon, 2008; Wood, 1991). Campbell (2007) argues that firms are more likely to engage in CSR 
if there is strong and well-enforced regulation and/or an effective system of self-regulation, 
shored up by active civil society organizations, institutional investors and the media (see also 
Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006). Businesses worldwide have expressed a remarkable 
interest in CSR and its formalized infrastructure, which ranges from codes of conduct through 
CSR standards to sustainability reporting along the guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative 
(Lee, 2008).  
Considerable CSR research has so far been undertaken on firms from developed countries 
(Egri & Ralston, 2008). However, there are key differences in approaches to CSR between 
developed and developing countries. In part, such differences result from the stage of economic 
development a country has reached. Many developing countries face a trade-off between social 
development and environmental protection (Muller & Kolk, 2009). The regulation of corporate 
social and environmental impacts is also often less stringent than in developed countries 
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(Blowfield & Frynas, 2005). Due to a limited capacity of regulators, compliance with even basic 
legislation cannot be taken for granted in many cases (Fox, 2004). The political system of many 
developing countries is furthermore shaped by a low salience of NGOs (Logsdon, Thomas, & 
Van Buren, 2006), while ethical consumerism is often not an established phenomenon either 
(Newell & Muro, 2006).  
At the same time, CSR is hardly a new idea for most developing countries. Albeit often 
termed differently, there have been similar conceptualizations of business responsibilities 
towards society in many countries (Blowfield & Frynas, 2005), whether these are based on the 
Confucian tradition in China (Wang & Juslin, 2009) or the social welfare tradition of the 
Catholic Church in Latin America (Logsdon et al., 2006). Thus, distinctive local forms of 
engagement with CSR are emerging in developing countries (Fox, 2004). 
MNEs find themselves subject to a particularly complex dynamic: Being exposed to 
various home and host country pressures to engage in socially responsible behaviour, they face 
not only increasingly complex but sometimes also competing social expectations (Arthaud-Day, 
2005; Husted & Allen, 2006; see also Kolk, 2016). This situation has a number of consequences. 
MNEs have become a key mechanism for the global spread of CSR as they implement CSR 
policies and instruments within their own operations as well as along their supply chains (Gugler 
& Shi, 2009). At the same time, MNEs may perform well on some CSR dimensions and less well 
on others, well in some geographic contexts and less well in others (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 
2006). An increasing professionalisation of CSR may also lead to a concentration of CSR-related 
decision-making at corporate headquarters, which may de-emphasize the needs of local 
communities where the MNE’s subsidiaries operate (Barkemeyer & Figge, 2014). These 
dynamics have so far largely been studied with regard to MNEs from developed countries. 
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However, in view of the rise of DMNEs, we would expect similar dynamics for these firms too. 
We propose to study these dynamics through an analysis of DMNE codes of conduct. 
Codes of Conduct 
The code of conduct is one of the most widely adopted CSR tools (KPMG, 2008; 
Wheldon & Webley, 2013) as well as being a highly visible aspect of global economic 
governance (Vogel, 2010). It has been defined as “an independent, company-specific document 
which delineates company responsibilities towards stakeholders and/or employee 
responsibilities” (Kaptein, 2004, p. 16). Internally, a code of conduct can encourage adherence to 
shared ethical aspirations and compliance with organizational rules (Erwin, 2011) as well as 
introducing coherent standards across the company (Carasco & Singh, 2003). Externally, codes 
can signal trustworthiness to outside stakeholders, such as regulators, customers, suppliers or 
shareholders (Cressey & Moore, 1983; Perez-Batres, Doh, Miller, & Pisani, 2012). However, a 
major criticism of codes of conduct is that these documents do not have the same clout as 
government regulation (Vogel, 2010). Scholars also noted a high degree of variability in code 
quality among companies, which is likely to impact code effectiveness (Erwin, 2011).  
Codes emerged first in the United States (Cressey & Moore, 1983). In recent decades, 
these documents have spread to other nations such as Canada and Australia (Singh, Carasco, 
Svensson, Wood, & Callaghan, 2005), the United Kingdom (Preuss, 2010), France and Germany 
(Langlois & Schlegelmilch, 1990). However, studies into the adoption of codes by companies 
from developing countries are still rare (Melé et al., 2006; for exceptions see Callaghan et al., 
2009; Welford, 2005). At the same time, these firms are under pressure to adopt codes from a 
variety of sources, ranging from requirements of international trade agreements (e.g. Mexico due 
to its membership of both OECD and NAFTA [Hood & Logsdon, 2002]), through demands by 
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overseas customers and financial markets (e.g. China [Egels-Zandén, 2014]), to pressure for the 
improvement of corporate governance (e.g. South Africa [Fig, 2005]). However, these pressures 
have so far been largely presented in isolation. Hence our aim – to provide a comparative global 
study by examining codes of DMNEs from Latin America, Africa and Asia – leads us to our first 
research question: 
Research Question 1: Are there differences in code adoption rates between developing 
country multinationals and their domestic counterparts? 
Towards a Multi-Dimensional Framework of CSR 
The literature has increasingly recognized that CSR has a multi-facetted nature (Arthaud-
Day, 2005; Wood, 1991). As a key example of a multidimensional model, Carroll’s (1979) 
influential pyramid of CSR encompasses a company’s economic, legal, ethical and discretionary 
responsibilities towards society. Developing this work further, Wood (1991) presented a 
framework of corporate social performance that combines principles of social responsibility, 
processes of social responsiveness and concrete outcomes of social behaviour. Arthaud-Day 
(2005) developed a model that combines three dimensions: (1) a transnational dimension, which 
builds on Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (2000) typology of international business strategies; (2) a 
content domain, which covers human rights, labour standards and the environment as suggested 
by the UN Global Compact; and (3) an operationalization perspective, covering what managers 
believe they should be doing, what society expects the firm to do and how the company 
operationalizes these concerns. However, such frameworks have proved difficult to 
operationalize (Acar, Aupperle, & Lowy, 2001; Wood & Jones, 1995). With regard to Carroll’s 
framework, for example, Visser (2006) has argued that the relative priorities of CSR in many 
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developing countries differ from the North American ordering; hence “Carroll’s CSR Pyramid 
may not be the best model for understanding CSR in general” (Visser, 2006, p. 29).  
We propose a multi-dimensional framework that is more parsimonious but at the same 
time easier to operationalize – one that goes back to the work of Zenisek (1979). He suggests a 
conceptualization of CSR based on the fit between the ethic of a business and societal 
expectations regarding the private sector’s proper conduct. The business ethic, in turn, consists of 
both an operational dimension, i.e. concrete actions by the firm, and a belief system, i.e. values 
and principles the company and its managers espouse. In the wake of Zenisek’s (1979) work, we 
propose to operationalize the multi-dimensional nature of CSR as comprising three different 
dimensions: 
 First, controversial behaviour that companies require their employees to avoid, such as 
not engaging in bribery. These issues are partly shaped by their national context but even 
more so by operational necessities, international regulation, stock market listing 
requirements and so forth. Hence, we would expect this dimension to show a high degree 
of similarity when firms from different countries are compared. 
 Second, corporate commitments to society. Here, companies respond to the needs of a 
specific society. These are likely to be, in the first instance, requirements of the firm’s 
home society; however these may overlap with requirements from other countries it 
operates in. Hence we would expect this dimension to show a medium degree of 
similarity when firms from different countries are compared. 
 Thirdly, ethical principles and values that companies commit themselves to uphold. Of 
the three, these are the deepest manifestation of their national context and hence likely to 
be less responsive to global pressure for change. Consequently, we would expect this 
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dimension to show a low degree of similarity when firms from different countries are 
compared.  
We explore these dimensions of CSR through an analysis of the content of codes of conduct 
adopted by DMNEs, which leads us to our second research question:  
Research Question 2: What are the CSR priorities of DMNEs – as expressed in their 
codes of conduct? 
In summary, we focus on codes of conduct as a representation of a company’s CSR 
values, principles and actions. We expect code adoption rates and content to vary but with 
common patterns emerging among developing countries. Furthermore, we expect those 
differences to be visible in the three dimensions we identified on the basis of Zenisek’s (1979) 
framework.  
 
STUDY 1: METHODS 
In this study, we sought to uncover whether levels of internationalization influence the 
adoption of codes of conduct, and what the differences in espoused CSR priorities – as expressed 
in these codes – are among DMNEs from different world regions. We analysed codes using a 
content analysis method that builds both on Zenisek’s (1979) conceptualization of CSR and an 
established framework that Kaptein (2004) used in a prior study of codes adopted by firms from 
developed countries. Content analysis has been extensively used in prior research (for an 
explanation, see Krippendorff, 2004), including research on CSR (for examples, see Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012; LaPlume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Once we had established whether a company had 
adopted a code, we used logistic regression to test if its level of internationalization influences 
code adoption (i.e. research question 1). To uncover priorities in code content (i.e. research 
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question 2), we first used content analysis to reveal firm priorities. Then we conducted a series of 
quantitative analyses (e.g. ANOVA, exploratory as well as confirmatory analysis) to validate 
these findings. In summary, we used mixed methods with a qualitative method being employed 
for exploratory analyses followed by quantitative methods for confirmatory analyses. 
Selection of Study Firms 
Given the wide range of ownership patterns in many developing countries (Dam & 
Scholtens, 2012), we sought to identify large DMNEs irrespective of ownership (i.e. covering 
publicly limited corporations, private companies as well as state-owned enterprises). As share 
indices could not be used, companies were identified through the Forbes Global 2000 Index, 
which applies four measures – sales, market value, assets and profits – to generate a composite 
measure of company size. The Forbes Global 2000 Index of 2014 included a total of 606 
companies from 35 developing countries. Our classification of countries as ‘developing country’ 
follows that of UNCTAD (2013), which classified all OECD member countries except Chile, 
Mexico, South Korea and Turkey as well as a number of European non-OECD member states as 
‘developed’ countries.2 Bermuda (9 companies) and Cayman Islands (1 company) were excluded 
due to their status as tax havens (for CSR in tax haven-based companies, see Preuss, 2012). Also, 
in order to ensure a minimum level of representativeness of the country subsamples, only 
countries with at least 5 codes were included in the final sample. For this reason, Bahrain (2 
companies in the Forbes Global 2000), Egypt (1), Jordan (1), Kazakhstan (3), Kuwait (4), 
Lebanon (2), Mauritius (1), Morocco (3), Oman (1), Pakistan (2), Peru (2), Puerto Rico (1), Togo 
(1) Venezuela (2) and Vietnam (2) were excluded from the sample.  
                                                     
2  Classifications of countries as developing countries, emerging economies or newly industrialized counties, are in 
some cases contentious. Our classification of developing countries includes Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan. This is not only in line with the classification by UNCTAD (2013) but also driven by the fact that 
companies from these countries traditionally had less exposure to the CSR discourse. 
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The resultant set of 568 companies was screened using the Bureau van Dijk Orbis and 
EBSCO Business databases in order to distinguish between multinational and purely domestic 
firms. Overall, the sample of 568 companies consisted of 407 DMNEs and 161 domestic firms. 
The full sample of 568 companies was used to analyse code adoption rates. Codes of conduct 
were obtained through a search of the respective company websites, as these are an approved, 
formal and official expression of corporate policy (Bondy, Matten, & Moon, 2008). 
Subsequently, content analysis was performed on all available DMNE codes of conduct. This 
resulted in a final sample of 179 DMNE codes from 18 countries (see Table 1). Data collection 
was performed between November 2014 and January 2015. 
Data Analyses 
Content analysis. Code content was analysed by counting the frequency of an item being 
mentioned rather than attempting to measure the degree to which it is discussed (Wood, 2000). 
The analysis followed the protocol of a prior study into codes by OECD country firms (Kaptein, 
2004)3 but used this in an iterative fashion. The OECD study was taken as a starting point for 
examining the content of the DMNE codes. However, the content analysis remained open to pick 
up issues that had not been mentioned in the OECD study. Building on Zenisek’s (1979) 
typology, themes identified in the code content analysis were then grouped into the three 
dimensions of controversial behaviour, corporate commitments to society and ethical principles.  
Once a coding frame had been established, coding was performed on the sample of 
DMNE codes. Items were coded as ‘1’ if they were referred to at least once in a given code and 
‘0’ if no reference was made to the item concerned. Similar words and expressions were 
                                                     
3  Kaptein (2004) examined the adoption rate of codes of conducts among the 200 largest companies in the world. 
While not explicitly designed as an OECD study, it is de facto one, as all the companies in his sample are based in 
OECD countries. 
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considered as long as they carried very close meanings, such as ‘loyalty’, ‘devotion’ and 
‘dedication’. Coding was undertaken by two of the three authors. Inter-rater agreement, 
calculated for a randomly selected sample (accounting for 40% of the overall sample) and 
expressed as Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) was .91.  
Quantitative analyses. After we had coded for code adoption, we used logistic regression 
to explore whether levels of internationalization influence code adoption (i.e. research question 
1). For the second research question (i.e. CSR priorities in code content), we first used ANOVA 
to test if there are differences in content. To validate the differences found in the content 
analysis, we then conducted exploratory and confirmatory analyses. 
Measures 
For the dependent variable code adoption, the existence of a code was used to code for 
adoption in a binary manner (0 = no code, 1 = code). For the independent variable, we coded the 
level of internationalization as a binary variable (0 = domestic firm, 1 = MNE) based on 
information from the EBSCO Business and Bureau van Dijk Orbis databases. For the control 
variables, a recent meta-analysis of the literature on CSR reporting identified three variables 
which influence whether firms create such reports: firm size, industry sector and region (Fifka, 
2013). Expecting a similar dynamic for codes of conduct, we used these three variables as 
controls. 
For size, we used log of assets (from the Forbes Global 2000 database), which has been 
used in prior research on international CSR (e.g. Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). For 
industry sector, we created five dummy variables based on the six main sectors found per Forbes 
Global 2000 list (i.e. consumer goods, energy & utilities, financials, industrials, information 
technology & telecommunications and materials; here we used materials as the referent group). 
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For region, we created two dummy variables based on the three main regions in the study (i.e. 
Latin America and Asia and used other regions as the referent group; China was considered 
separately given that it constituted by far the largest country subsample). 
 
STUDY 1: RESULTS 
Code Adoption   
Of the 586 developing country companies considered in the sample, 34% made a code of 
conduct available through their website (see Table 1). For comparison, earlier studies of 
developed country firms found adoption rates of 92% for the largest 250 firms worldwide 
(KPMG, 2008) or 98% for the FTSE 350 companies in the UK (Wheldon & Webley, 2013), 
respectively. In our sample, a notable divide emerged between DMNEs and their domestic 
counterparts: whilst 44% of DMNEs issued a code of conduct, a mere 12 codes could be found 
among the 161 domestic firms (7.5%). 
In addition, other patterns of code adoption can be found. Adoption rates are very 
unequal within the sample. Adoption among Brazilian, Chilean, Colombian, South African and 
Thai companies is 80% or higher. In stark contrast, companies from the Middle East and East 
Asia show very low adoption rates. Only 8 out of 149 Chinese companies (and 7 out of 65 
Chinese DMNEs) published a code of conduct. It should be noted, however, that a relatively 
large number of Chinese companies appear to prefer a different format, such as commenting on 
core elements of their corporate culture and values, rather than providing a corporate code of 
conduct.4 However, these statements on corporate values are usually light in terms of concrete 
                                                     
4  For example, it is Form 20-F, filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2009, Sinopec-China 
Petroleum wrote: “We have not adopted a code of ethics […] since it is not a customary practice for a PRC 
company to adopt such code of ethics.” 
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company commitments and thus do not constitute a functional equivalent of a code of conduct 
(on the difference between a code of conduct and a value statement see Murphy, 1995). 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
Confirmatory analysis. We further analysed our results through a logistic regression. 
Here, we also explored other variables, because sector affiliation and in particular company size 
may play a role in explaining differences in code adoption between multinationals and their 
domestic counterparts (a correlation matrix and the results of the logistic regression analysis are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3). As our results show, levels of internationalization clearly have a 
positive and significant effect on code adoption. In addition, we can indeed observe clear 
regional and sector-level differences in code adoption when compared to the reference groups 
Other Regions and Materials, respectively. Chinese firms stand out in terms of a significantly 
lower likelihood of issuing a code. Significantly higher levels of code adoption were identified 
among IT and telecommunication firms, as well as among Latin American firms. However, we 
found that company size does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of code adoption.   
[insert Table 2 about here] 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
Code Content 
With regard to code content, our analysis provides support for the assertion that content 
can indeed be grouped in the three dimensions derived from Zenisek’s (1979) work (a summary 
of code content for the individual country subsamples is provided in Appendices A-D. In the 
following section, we highlight a few key themes regarding how code content varies in both 
depth and breadth of coverage. Some of the codes included in the analysis only cover a limited 
number of key terms, whereas others are substantial documents. For example, the code of Indian 
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telecommunications firm Reliance Communications runs to 56 pages and that of Brazilian steel 
manufacturer Metalurgica Gerdau has 52 pages. The breadth of code content also reflects a 
considerable diversity of issues. Saudi Arabian industrial company Savola alerts its employees to 
the need not to spread gossip; United Arab Emirates NBD Bank prohibits the use of profane 
language; and Malaysian oil and gas firm Petronas bans cross-dressing.  
Despite the variance in depth and breadth, a wide range of recurring themes can be 
identified across the sample of the codes of conduct (Table 4 summarizes code content along 
with more descriptive statistics). Not least, our analysis uncovered differences in the degree of 
coverage among the three dimensions. Codes typically discuss at considerable length which 
types of controversial behaviour employees should seek to avoid. On average, 72% of all items 
in this category are addressed. In contrast, code stipulations regarding the role business should 
play in society receive the lowest coverage at 18%. Occupying a middle position, 46% of all 
items in the ethical principles category are addressed.  
[insert Table 4 about here] 
In addition, our analysis uncovered common themes within each dimension. In the 
Controversial Behaviour dimension, observing laws, conflicts of interest and confidentiality of 
information stand out as the three most frequently mentioned items across the sample. Other 
items that are addressed by at least two-thirds of all codes are bribery, sound accounting, gift 
giving, protection of company assets, insider information and protection of intellectual property. 
In the Society dimension, only the two items improving the quality of life for communities and 
political neutrality emerge as relatively widespread in the sample with coverage of 43% and 
39%, respectively. In contrast, the prioritization of items in the Ethical Principles dimension is 
more diverse. Twenty-one distinct themes were identified, all of which are at least reasonably 
17 
 
 
widespread with coverage levels between 17% and 87%. Fairness/impartiality is the most 
frequently mentioned item in this category at 87%, followed by honesty/truth at 81% and 
integrity at 73%. 
Beyond these general patterns, there is a considerable amount of country-level variation 
within the sample (see Appendix D). Whilst controversial behaviour receives the highest 
coverage in all countries, followed by ethical principles and commitments to society, there are 
clear differences in the comprehensiveness of codes. Codes by Brazilian and Mexican DMNEs 
appear most comprehensive and address a wide range of items, in particular in the ethical 
principles dimension, while Asian (and in particular East Asian) DMNEs provide comparatively 
little information in their codes. Singaporean DMNEs typically provide no information in the 
society category, neither do Taiwanese and Saudi Arabian DMNEs. Brazilian DMNE codes 
prioritize items in the society and ethical principles categories, while Chilean codes emphasize 
controversial behaviour. Saudi Arabian codes provide relatively little information for any of the 
three CSR dimensions, whereas DMNEs based in the United Arab Emirates do typically 
acknowledge a range of items linked to controversial behaviour. Despite these country-level 
differences within the three categories, a clear pattern can be observed at the level of overall 
code content: In each of the 18 country subsamples, controversial behaviour is the most 
frequently addressed category, followed by ethical principles and commitments to society, 
respectively. 
Confirmatory analyses. We then analysed the validity of the findings from the content 
analysis. We first tested whether differences in dimensions exist among companies. ANOVA 
results show that mean differences were significantly different for controversial behaviour, F(17, 
173) = 5.23, p < .001, commitments to society, F(17, 173) = 4.37, p < .001, and ethical 
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principles, F(17, 173) = 5.26, p < .001. Of the three dimensions, controversial behaviour had the 
highest coverage (M = .77, SD = .30) compared to commitments to society, (M = .25, SD = .27) 
and ethical principles (M = .60, SD = .32). This result is thus similar to the findings from the 
content analysis. 
In the content analysis, we adapted an established measure for code content which had 
been used for developed countries (Kaptein, 2004), but not for developing ones. Based on the 
work of Zenisek (1979), we then categorized the items into three categories (i.e. controversial 
behaviour, corporate commitments to society and ethical principles). In order to test whether a 
three-factor structure is appropriate, we performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using 
Principal Axis Factoring and orthogonal Varimax rotation. In order to avoid using the same 
sample for both the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, we used a split-sample design 
(e.g. Koh, Steers, & Terborg, 1995) in which the sample was randomly split into two. The split-
half sample for the exploratory factor analysis consisted of codes of conduct by 94 companies 
from 18 countries. The split-half sample for the confirmatory factor analysis included 97 codes 
from 18 countries. 
The Bartlett test of sphericity was significant, 2 (105) = 304.34, p < .001. In addition, 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin as well as anti-correlation matrix values for individual items were above the 
recommended cut-off value of 0.50 (Field, 2000). Moreover, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
sampling adequacy was 0.72 (p < .001). Therefore the data showed that there was a patterned 
relationship between the items; or in other words, the data was sufficient for EFA (Field, 2000). 
Using an eigenvalue cut-off of 1.0, there were three factors that explain a cumulative variance of 
47%. The scree plot confirmed that the three factors could be retained. We then removed items 
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that did not fit the factors well, such as those that loaded on the factor below a cut-off value of 
0.4 (Stevens, 1992).  
Next, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the second sample that 
resulted from randomly splitting the original sample (n = 97). Despite the low statistical power, 
the model showed good fit according to recommended values (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The root-
mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) was 0.046 with 90% confidence intervals of 
0.000 and 0.075 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) for 
the model was 0.074. The comparative fit index (CFI) for the model was 0.94 and the Tucker and 
Lewis index (TLI) was 0.93. Difference tests showed that a three-factor model was better than a 
two-factor model (2 difference = 110.89, df = 44, p < .001) and a one-factor model (2 
difference = 293.46, df = 89, p < .001).  
In summary, Study 1 uncovered company-level patterns that exist within the sample of 
developing country codes, not least that DMNEs are much more likely to adopt a code than their 
domestic counterparts.  
 
STUDY 2:  COUNTRY-LEVEL INFLUENCES ON DIFFERENCES IN DMNE CODES 
OF CONDUCT 
Having identified patterns in code adoption and content in our sample of DMNE codes, 
we now develop and test hypotheses that could explain these patterns. To capture these 
relationships, we use the literature on National Business Systems (NBS) (Whitley, 1999; Witt & 
Redding, 2014) and Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancké, Rhodes, & 
Thatcher, 2007). Our Study 2 is thus guided by our third research question: 
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Research Question 3: How is the content of DMNE codes of conduct shaped by the 
elements of their country’s National Business System? 
Whitley (1999, p. 33) defines National Business Systems as “distinctive patterns of 
economic organization that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of 
economic activities, and in the organization, and interconnections between owners, managers, 
experts, and other employees”. He draws out four major elements of an NBS, (1) the political 
system, (2) the financial system, (3) the education and labour system and (4) the cultural system.5 
These elements of an NBS or a VoC can combine in multiple ways, but only where the elements 
complement each other to form a coherent logic for economic activity is such a combination 
likely to attain a degree of stability over time. Here Hall and Soskice (2001) introduce the 
concept of institutional complementarity: two or more institutions are complementary if the 
presence or efficiency of one increases the returns from or efficiency of the other(s) (see also 
Andriesse & van Westen, 2009). At the firm level, Hall and Soskice (2001) stress that the 
interlinkages between the elements of an NBS/VoC reward those firms whose strategies have a 
high degree of fit with the opportunities and resources provided by the respective NBS/VoC, and 
disadvantage firms whose strategies are not aligned with these elements (see also Carney, 
Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009).  
The NBS/VoC approach has seen a growing application, not only to developed but also 
to developing countries (Andriesse & van Westen, 2009; Carney et al., 2009; Witt & Redding, 
2014). Furthermore, the concept of an NBS has spawned a growing literature on cross-national 
                                                     
5  For reasons of greater clarity, our terminology here follows Matten and Moon (2008). The original terminology by 
Whitley (1999) is: (1) the state, (2) the financial system, (3) the skill development and control system and (4) 
norms and values governing trust and authority relations. Furthermore, we acknowledge that our discussion of the 
NBS elements takes a broad brush approach. Nonetheless, we maintain that there is value in considering the 
individual elements as separate analytical categories. 
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differences in CSR priorities (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Matten & Moon, 2008). For 
example, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) present data on companies from 42 countries, 
predominantly developed ones, to show that institutions linked to the political system have the 
clearest impact on corporate social performance. 
The literature has proposed two opposing views on how exactly differences between 
NBSs and VoCs foster differences in approaches to CSR, according to which CSR is either a 
‘substitute’ or a ‘mirror’ of national institutional structures (Brown & Knudsen, 2015; Koos, 
2012). According to the ‘substitute’ view, countries with less robust regulatory systems, a 
weaker government role in welfare provision or less developed forms of stakeholder 
participation have a greater need for CSR, and firms in such countries are more likely to engage 
in CSR activities to counter these institutional deficiencies (Hiss, 2009; Jackson & Apostolakou, 
2010). Following the ‘mirror’ view, firms are more likely to engage in CSR where national 
institutional structures are shaped by strong government regulation, an active civil society, well-
functioning industrial relations structures or strong normative pressure to engage in socially 
responsible behaviour (Campbell, 2007; Gjølberg, 2009). Either way, the individual elements of 
an NBS can be expected to have profound implications for the ways in which firms from 
different countries engage with CSR. In the following sections, we focus on the political, 
financial and labour elements of an NBS, and put forward hypotheses as to how the content of 
codes of conduct is affected by each of these elements of an NBS. 
Political System  
According to Whitley (1999, p. 48), countries differ in the extent to which governments 
“directly or indirectly regulate market boundaries, entry and exit, as well as set constraints on the 
activities of economic actors”, whether through pursuing active industrial policies, supporting 
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collective intermediate organizations or the regulation of markets. While some states, such as 
France, Japan or more recently China (Nee, Opper, & Wong, 2007), have at various times 
pursued an active industrial policy, many developing countries suffer from inefficient 
government organizations, high levels of corruption or even civil unrest (Hamann, Kapelus, 
Sonnenberg, Mackenzie, & Hollesen, 2005). Therefore, we would expect the content of codes of 
conduct by DMNEs from different countries to be shaped by key factors of the political system, 
like the quality of political institutions. Following the ‘substitute view’ of CSR as explained 
above (Hiss, 2009; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010), we expect companies based in countries 
characterized by weak political institutions to communicate a wider set of responsibilities in their 
codes of conduct.  
Hypothesis 1. The political system affects the comprehensiveness of codes of conduct, 
such that the quality of political institutions is negatively related to total code coverage. 
Financial System  
Following Whitley (1999, p. 49), the financial system “deals with the processes by which 
capital is made available and priced. In particular, is it allocated by capital markets through 
competition […] or is it provided by some set of intermediaries that deal directly with firms and 
become locked into their particular success?” In many developing countries stock markets and 
institutional investors play a much smaller role than in the Anglo-American system and many 
emerging economies have also been more volatile, which leaves firms with fewer financing 
options (Céspedes, González, & Molina, 2010). For example, Chilean firms have been found to 
often operate as business groups with common family ownership among all the group’s firms 
because this organizational form overcomes the lack of financing through capital markets (Silva, 
Majluf, & Paredes, 2006). These differences between countries again can be expected to have 
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repercussions for the CSR-related commitments firms make. In line with the ‘substitute view’ of 
CSR (Hiss, 2009; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010), we would expect weaker financial market-
related institutional structures to trigger higher levels of CSR engagement by firms from these 
countries. Companies are therefore likely to communicate a wider set of responsibilities in 
weaker macroeconomic environments.  
Hypothesis 2. The financial system affects the comprehensiveness of codes of conduct, 
such that the quality of the macroeconomic environment is negatively related to total 
code coverage. 
Labour System  
Whitley (1999, p. 50) furthermore argues that NBSs differ in terms of “the system that 
develops and certifies competences and skills: the education and training system” as well as “the 
institutions that control the terms on which the owners of those skills sell them in labour markets 
and how those markets are organized”, i.e. the labour system. According to the World Economic 
Forum (2014), efficient labour markets promote meritocracy in the workplace and “allow for 
wage fluctuations without much social disruption” (World Economic Forum, 2014, p. 7). In this 
respect, key differences between developed and developing countries can again be observed, 
although there are of course huge differences within either group too. Many developing countries 
face challenges in terms of labour market efficiency. Earnings levels are often low despite long 
working hours, income is often more uncertain, and there is a greater reliance on non-wage 
labour, particularly in agriculture. Moreover, in many countries women are particularly 
disadvantaged in getting access to labour markets (Fields, 2011). These differences in labour 
market efficiency are likely to influence the content of a firm’s code of conduct.  Following the 
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‘substitute view’ of CSR again, we expect code content to be more comprehensive in countries 
where labour market efficiency is low.  
Hypothesis 3. The labour system affects the comprehensiveness of codes of conduct, such 
that labour market efficiency is negatively related to total code coverage. 
 
STUDY 2: METHOD 
Sample 
The same sample of 179 DMNE codes from 18 countries used in Study 1 was also used 
for Study 2 (see Table 1). However, the software that we used for multilevel modelling (HLM 
Version 7; Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2011) deletes groups (i.e. countries 
in our study) if there is missing data at the group level (i.e. in our study independent variables at 
the country level). This process resulted in a final sample for Study 2 of 164 DMNE codes from 
15 countries.  
Measures 
Dependent variable: coverage in codes of conduct. We used the measure that resulted 
from the confirmatory factor analysis in Study 1. The final measure consists of 15 items, with 5 
items for each of the three factors (i.e. controversial behaviour, commitments to society, ethical 
principles). As explained previously, they were coded as ‘1’ if they were referred to at least once 
in a given code and ‘0’ if no reference was made to the item concerned. We then used the mean 
of the items, resulting in a variable that measures the amount of coverage in codes of conduct. 
Independent variables. Building on previous studies (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; 
Whitley, 1999), a number of additional independent variables were used to identify relationships 
between the elements of a National Business System and code content. For Hypotheses 1, 2 and 
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3, we used data from the 2014-2015 Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 
2014), which has been and used in prior research (e.g., Shaner & Maznevski, 2011; Wan & 
Hoskisson, 2003). Specifically, for the political system (Hypothesis 1), we used quality of 
political institutions (World Economic Forum, 2014). For the financial system (Hypothesis 2), 
we used quality of the macroeconomic environment (World Economic Forum, 2014). For the 
labour system (Hypothesis 3), we used labour market efficiency (World Economic Forum, 
2014).  
Control variables. We used the same control variables as in Study 1: log assets of size 
and dummy variables for industry sector and region. In order to build on Study 1, we also 
included a control variable for the level of internationalization, which explored the influence of 
internationalization on code coverage. For levels of internationalization, we used foreign sales 
divided by total sales (from the Bureau van Dijk Orbis database), with the purpose to partial out 
international effects so that country effects could be more accurately analysed. 
Data Analyses 
Study 2 focuses on the effects of NBS elements on companies which are headquartered in 
these countries. In order to test our hypotheses and properly capture between-country 
differences, we employed hierarchical linear modelling (HLM Version 7; Raudenbush et al., 
2011). As recommended by Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), our HLM model consisted of two 
levels. Company-level data was modelled at level 1 and country characteristics at level 2. 
Following recommended procedures for centring in order to facilitate interpretation and also to 
reduce multicollinearity, level-1 variables (i.e. size, level of internationalization) were group-
centred except for dummy-coded variables (i.e. industry, region), while level-2 variables were 
grand-mean centred (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). Due to high correlations between variables, we 
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calculated variance inflation factors (VIF). The highest VIF was 1.76, which is well below the 
recommended cut-off value of 10, suggesting that multicollinearity was not an issue (Ryan, 
1997). We used restricted maximum likelihood estimation. While estimation techniques will 
provide similar results for larger samples, for smaller samples such as ours it is important to 
choose the more reliable approach (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Therefore we chose restricted 
maximum likelihood, because it reduces bias in the estimates of the variances (Snijders & 
Bosker, 2012). However, we also tested our data with full maximum likelihood, finding very 
similar results. 
 
STUDY 2: RESULTS 
Hypotheses Testing 
Table 5 shows descriptives and a matrix of correlations of the variables employed in this 
study, while Table 6 displays the HLM results. We first tested a Null model with only the 
dependent variable in order to examine whether a multilevel model is necessary. The overall 
intra-class correlation (ICC) is 0.33; in other words, 33% of the variance in code coverage 
resided between countries. Then, in Model 1 of the HLM analysis, we included only the control 
variables. Finally, in Model 2, we added the independent variables. Dummy codes for industry 
and region are not displayed in Table 6 for purposes of brevity; however we included them in the 
analysis and none of the dummy variables were significant in either Model 1 or 2. Because HLM 
does not provide effect sizes when using restricted maximum likelihood, we followed procedures 
recommended by Hofmann (1997) to calculate effect size. Model 1 explained 34% of the 
variance in the dependent variable (R2 = 0.34), while Model 2 showed an improvement with 83% 
of the variance explained (R2 = 0.83). 
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[insert Table 5 about here] 
Hypothesis 1 was supported as quality of political institutions was significantly and 
negatively related to code coverage (γ = -0.46, p < .01). Hypothesis 2 was supported as quality of 
the macroeconomic environment was significantly and negatively related to code coverage (γ = -
0.17, p < .01). Hypothesis 3 was not supported as labour market efficiency was significantly but 
positively related to code coverage (γ = 0.55, p < .01), whereas we had hypothesised a negative 
relationship. 
[insert Table 6 about here] 
Post Hoc Analysis 
We also analysed the full sample that included both multinationals and domestic 
companies (n = 191) and results for all the hypotheses in Study 2 were similar. Quality of 
political institutions was significantly and negatively related to code coverage (γ = -0.42, p < 
.01). Quality of the macroeconomic environment was significantly and negatively related to code 
coverage (γ = -0.18, p < .01). Labour market efficiency was significantly and positively related to 
code coverage (γ = 0.60, p < .01). 
 
DISCUSSION 
A number of general patterns with regard to code adoption and content have emerged 
from the two studies above. First of all, codes are being adopted by developing country firms – 
and in particular DMNEs – but adoption rates still lag behind firms from developed countries (cf. 
Kaptein, 2004; KPMG, 2008; Wheldon & Webley, 2013). It is important to note that adoption is 
also very unequal across the sample. Whilst 44% of the DMNEs issued a code of conduct, only 
7.5% of their domestic counterparts did so. In geographic terms, codes have become widespread 
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among Brazilian, Colombian, South African, Thai and Turkish MNEs, whereas MNEs from 
other developing countries have adopted codes in much smaller numbers. Some countries, 
furthermore, seem to use somewhat different formats to express commitments to stakeholder 
demands. One example is a high number of Chinese companies which have opted for a short 
‘corporate culture’ section on their corporate website rather than a comprehensive code of 
conduct. 
Beyond code adoption rates, the content of the codes – analysed across the three 
dimensions derived from Zenisek’s (1979) conceptualization of CSR – has revealed a number of 
patterns too. Controversial behaviour is the most comprehensively addressed dimension across 
the sample, with societal commitments and ethical principles playing a less prominent role. In 
addition, code content appears most homogeneous in the controversial behaviour category. At 
the other end of the spectrum, the category ethical principles contained a wider range of themes 
(21 compared to 13 each in the other two categories), with the majority of these only being 
addressed by relatively few DMNEs. In other words, code content is more heterogeneous in this 
category. The society category emerges as a middle-ground in terms of diversity, but items in 
this category show very low coverage. 
In the second study, the National Business Systems perspective has helped us to reveal a 
number of factors that shape the content of DMNE codes of conduct, and thus to explain some of 
the patterns identified in the first study. The dominant picture here is that of a ‘substitute role’ of 
CSR (Hiss, 2009; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010), with companies from countries with weaker 
governance structures and a weaker macroeconomic environment communicating a wider set of 
social responsibilities in their codes of conduct. This negative link appears to be particularly 
pronounced in relation to commitments to society. These findings confirm prior findings in the 
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literature (e.g. Hamann, Kapelus, & O’Keefe, 2011) that, in the light of governance deficits or 
failures, companies may assume a more proactive role as corporate citizens. These results 
therefore provide support for the argument that a more exposed role of DMNEs in society leads 
to more comprehensive codes of conduct.  
However, this relationship does not appear to apply to a country’s labour system. Here, a 
‘mirror effect’ (Campbell, 2007; Gjølberg, 2009) can be observed, where – contrary to our 
expectation – the higher the quality of labour-related governance, the more likely companies 
from these countries are to issue comprehensive codes of conduct. One explanation could be that 
companies are more reluctant to address issues that are more closely related to their core 
business (such as labour relations), than those issues that mainly pose challenges outside of the 
company gates. In any case, these results tally with earlier findings in the literature in that a 
company’s CSR activities geared towards internal and external stakeholders do not necessarily 
follow the same trajectory (Hine & Preuss, 2009; Wood & Jones, 1995). Our findings thus allow 
for a more nuanced view on the ‘substitute versus mirror’ debate in international CSR: rather 
than constituting a blanket (‘substitute’ or ‘mirror’) effect, different NBS elements appear to 
trigger different dynamics, leading to the existence of both ‘mirror’ and ‘substitute’ effects at the 
level of different NBS elements.  
Furthermore, the DMNEs in our sample were found to be much more likely to adopt a 
code of conduct than their purely domestic counterparts. This finding is in line with arguments in 
the literature that – in comparison with purely domestic firms – MNEs are confronted with 
particularly complex expectations regarding their engagement in CSR activities. Not only does 
the MNE have its own home country-based heritage and predisposition towards a particular form 
of engaging in CSR, which may conflict with expectations in some of the multiple host countries 
30 
 
 
it operates (Arthaud-Day, 2005); the multiple host countries themselves are likely to differ in 
terms of geographic and culture distance from the MNE home country (Campbell, Eden & 
Miller, 2012). However, the degree of internationalization does not constitute an automatic 
effect. Not least, higher levels of internationalization – measured in terms of FSTS – did not 
translate into more comprehensive codes. Furthermore, the impact of these internationalization 
pressures was found to be affected by other factors, not least those relating to the country’s 
National Business System. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The rise to economic prominence of multinational firms from developing countries (Luo 
& Tung, 2007), on the one hand, and the rapid spread around the world of CSR (Visser & 
Tolhurst, 2010), on the other hand, were the starting points for two inter-related enquiries into 
CSR-related commitments by DMNEs. We investigated these commitments through a content 
analysis of a sample of 179 codes of conduct adopted by MNEs from 18 developing countries in 
Latin America, Africa and Asia. Our initial study examined general patterns regarding code 
adoption and code content. Extending the work of Zenisek (1979), we analysed our data through 
the lens of a multi-dimensional framework of CSR, which captured (1) controversial behaviour 
companies require their employees to avoid, (2) commitments companies make to improve 
society and (3) ethical principles and values companies promise to uphold. We followed this first 
study up with a second study in which we used the National Business Systems (NBS) and 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) perspective as a theoretical lens to investigate country-level 
drivers of differences in code content. 
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Overall, our application of both Zenisek’s (1979) three-dimensional conceptualization of 
CSR and a National Business Systems perspective to the analysis of the content of DMNE codes 
of conduct has uncovered a number of interesting patterns. In general, different patterns emerged 
at the level of the three CSR dimensions, thereby also confirming the explanatory power of the 
three-dimensional CSR model (which was further supported by the results of the confirmatory 
factor analysis). Our findings show that the dimension of controversial behaviour is the most 
uniform of the three, whereas the dimensions commitments to society and ethical principles 
appear more diverse and more context-specific.  
Regarding the impact of contextual factors on overall code content, our study provided 
empirical support for the ‘substitute’ view of CSR in developing countries (Hiss, 2009; Jackson 
& Apostolakou, 2010) – DMNEs from poorer countries and from countries with lower 
governance effectiveness tend to express more comprehensive commitments to society. 
However, this pattern does not extend to a country’s labour system. Here, firms from countries 
with more efficient labour markets communicate a more extensive set of social responsibilities 
in, thereby conforming to the ‘mirror’ view of CSR (Campbell, 2007; Gjølberg, 2009). 
Furthermore, we can report that multinationals from developing countries are much more likely 
to adopt a code of conduct than their purely domestic counterparts; however, this does not 
translate into differences in terms of code comprehensiveness. Yet, rather than constituting a 
blanket effect, the impact of the degree of internationalization is affected by other factors relating 
to a country’s National Business System, in particular those relating to the political, financial and 
labour systems.   
The paper has a number of limitations. First, the research design captured espoused 
values rather than corporate practice. A long-standing research stream has shown that practice 
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does not automatically follow values (Christmann & Taylor, 2006); rather, they can form a 
complex and often contradictory relationship (Devinney, 2009). The relationship between 
corporate values and practice is particularly complex for MNEs, where CSR strategy is often 
designed at the company’s headquarters whereas actual practice needs to take account of the 
situation in a number of different countries (Barkemeyer & Figge, 2014; Strike et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, our research explicitly focused on DMNEs and hence may not be generalizable to 
smaller (and in particular to purely domestic) firms outside the Forbes Global 2000. In addition, 
the research design focused on the level of the nation state, and therefore treated nations as 
homogeneous entities (see the critique by McSweeney, 2009). Finally, there are limitations that 
arise from the relatively small sample size available for this study. Given that codes of conduct 
are still relatively scarce among developing country DMNEs, the above analysis is exploratory in 
nature, focusing on the identification of general patterns across a diverse set of countries and 
companies.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, we suggest that the codes analysed in this paper 
cumulatively allow us to uncover differences in CSR priorities of MNEs from different 
developing countries. Given the increasing weight of DMNEs in the global economy, future 
research will be able to employ larger samples that can validate the patterns identified in this 
paper. Likewise, future research could produce a validated CSR scale that can be applied to 
codes of conduct. Moreover, larger sample sizes than the one we used, and thus higher statistical 
power, might result in a reliable scale that has more items per dimension. A larger sample will 
also enable enquiries into in-country differences in approaches to CSR, such as between 
industries or between DMNEs of different types of ownership. 
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Table 1: Code Adoption by Developing Country Firms 2014 
Country 
All Companies Domestic Companies MNEs 
No. of 
Companies 
No. of 
Codes 
Adoption 
[%] 
No. of 
Companies 
No. of 
Codes 
Adoption 
[%] 
No. of MNEs 
No. of 
Codes 
Adoption 
[%] 
Brazil 25 22 88.0 4 3 75.0 21 19 90.5 
Chile 8 5 62.5 2 0 0.0 6 5 83.3 
China 149 8 5.4 84 1 1.2 65 7 10.8 
Colombia 6 5 83.3 1 0 0.0 5 5 100 
Hong Kong-China 58 9 15.5 19 0 0.0 39 9 23.1 
India 54 17 31.5 20 1 5.0 34 16 47.1 
Indonesia 9 6 66.7 2 1 50.0 7 5 71.4 
Malaysia 17 9 52.9 1 0 0.0 16 9 56.3 
Mexico 16 8 50.0 3 0 0.0 13 8 61.5 
Nigeria 5 0 0.0 0 0 n.a. 5 0 0.0 
Philippines 10 5 50.0 3 1 33.3 7 4 57.1 
Qatar 8 0 0.0 1 0 0.0 7 0 0.0 
Saudi Arabia 20 6 30.0 6 1 16.7 14 5 35.7 
Singapore 17 6 35.3 0 0 n.a. 17 6 35.3 
South Africa 15 12 80.0 1 0 0.0 14 12 85.7 
South Korea 61 29 47.5 4 0 0.0 57 29 50.9 
Taiwan 47 14 29.8 5 0 0.0 42 14 33.3 
Thailand 17 15 88.2 3 3 100 14 12 85.7 
Turkey 12 9 75.0 0 0 n.a. 12 9 75.0 
United Arab Emirates 14 6 42.9 2 1 50.0 12 5 41.7 
Overall 568 191 33.6 161 12 7.5 407 179 44.0 
Note: Bermuda (9 companies) excluded due to its status as haven; also excluded due to low number of companies in Forbes Global 2000 Index 2014: Bahrain (2 companies), 
Cayman Islands (1), Egypt (1), Jordan (1), Kazakhstan (3), Kuwait (4), Lebanon (2), Mauritius (1), Morocco (3), Oman (1), Pakistan (2), Peru (2), Puerto Rico (1), Togo (1), 
Venezuela (2), Vietnam (2).
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix (Code Adoption) 
 
 Mean SD i ii 
i Code adoption 0.34 0.47 −  
ii Level of internationalization 0.72 0.45 0.35*** − 
iii Size (log assets) 1.35 0.53 0.02 0.04 
n = 179  
*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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Table 3: Logistic Regression Model for Adoption of Codes of Conduct as the Outcome Variable 
 
   95% Confidence Interval  
for Odds Ratio 
  B S.E. Wald Test Exp (B) 
(Odds Ratio) 
Lower Upper 
Included       
Constant -2.29 .54 18.25    
Consumer goods & services -.36 .39 .83 .70 .32 1.51 
Energy & utilities .34 .47 .54 1.41 .56 3.51 
Financials -.65 .38 2.85 .52 .25 1.11 
Industrials -.39 .39 .99 .68 .31 1.46 
IT & telecommunications 1.04* .41 6.56 2.83 1.28 6.27 
Asia excluding China -.39 .28 1.81 .68 .39 1.19 
China -2.40*** .47 26.03 .09 .04 .23 
Latin America 1.42** .43 10.84 4.11 1.78 9.55 
Size .50 .26 3.69 1.65 .99 2.76 
Internationalization 1.90*** .36 28.19 6.65 3.30 13.39 
n = 568 
R2 = 0.26 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), 0.28 (Cox & Snell), 0.38 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(10) = 541.68, p < 0.001.       
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. The reference group for Sector is Materials and for Region Other Regions. 
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Table 4: Code Content 2014 (n = 179) 
 
A 
Average Coverage by Category/Item 2014 
  % Rank         
   Controversial behaviour 72.3 1         
   Society 17.6 3        
   Ethical principles 45.7 2       
   TOTAL 45.2 n.a.    
         Average Coverage by Item % Rank 
 
B 
C
O
N
T
R
O
V
E
R
S
IA
L
 B
E
H
A
V
IO
U
R
 
1.01 Observe laws 0.93 1  
D 
E
T
H
IC
A
L
 P
R
IN
C
IP
L
E
S
 
3.01 Fairness, impartiality 0.87 1 
1.02 Confidentiality of information 0.93 1 3.02 Honesty, truth 0.81 2 
1.03 Conflict of interests 0.91 3  3.03 Integrity 0.73 3 
1.04 Bribery 0.86 4  3.04 Professional standards 0.70 4 
1.05 Sound accounting 0.83 5  3.05 Empathy, respect 0.70 4 
1.06 Gifts 0.82 6  3.06 Equity, equality, justice 0.67 6 
1.07 Protection of company assets 0.80 7  3.07 Transparency, openness 0.65 7 
1.08 Insider information 0.73 8  3.08 Trust 0.58 8 
1.09 Intellectual property, copyright 0.67 9  3.09 Care, diligence, prudence 0.46 9 
1.10 Fraud, embezzlement 0.59 10  3.10 Teamwork, cooperation 0.45 10 
1.11 Nepotism, favouritism 0.58 11  3.11 Efficiency, cost conscious 0.44 11 
1.12 Misrepresentation of product 0.40 12  3.12 Dignity 0.40 12 
1.13 Use of electronic media 0.37 13  3.13 Excellence 0.36 13 
      3.14 Dialogue, open communication 0.35 14 
 
S
O
C
IE
T
Y
 
2.01 Improve quality of life for community 0.43 1  3.15 Loyalty, devotion 0.25 15 
C 2.02 Political neutrality 0.39 2  3.16 Accountability 0.24 16 
 2.03 Respect human rights 0.31 3  3.17 Confidence, be upright 0.23 17 
 2.04 Support national development 0.25 4  3.18 Consistency 0.21 18 
 2.05 Donations, sponsorship, education 0.22 5  3.19 Keep promises 0.17 19 
 2.06 Promote employee volunteering 0.16 6  3.20 Reliability 0.17 19 
 2.07 Government as stakeholder 0.14 7  3.21 Harmony 0.17 19 
 2.08 Pay taxes timely 0.13 8   
 2.09 Foster citizenship 0.12 9  
 2.10 Recognize the role of the media 0.06 10  
 2.11 Work with NGOs 0.05 11  
 2.12 Support democracy 0.04 12  
 2.13 Compensate for damage 0.01 13  
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix (Code Content) 
  
Mean SD i ii iii iv v vi 
i Code coverage   − 
     
ii Internationalization 0.36 0.33 0.06 −     
iii Size (log assets) 3.21 1.18 0.06 -0.25** −    
iv Quality of Institutions 4.22 0.75 -0.31** 0.30** -0.13 −   
v Macroeconomic Environment 5.53 0.83 -0.31** 0.02 0.03 0.32** −  
vi Labour Market Efficiency 4.23 0.56 -0.22** 0.29** -0.08 0.84** 0.58** − 
n = 179  
*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 6: Hierarchical Linear Models for Coverage of Codes of Conduct as the Outcome Variable 
 
Variables Model 1a Model 2 a 
 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
 
Intercept 0.53*** 0.09 0.71*** 0.10 
Size (log of Assets) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Internationalization (Foreign Sales / Total Sales) 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Quality of Institutions   -0.42** 0.11 
Macroeconomic Environment   -0.17** 0.05 
Labour Market Efficiency   0.55** 0.15 
n = 164 companies at Level 1; n = 15 countries at Level 2; SE = Standard errors 
*p<0.05;**p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
(a) The analyses included dummy variables for sector and region as control variables, but are not shown in the Table above 
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APPENDIX A: Code Content – Controversial Behaviour (DMNEs, 2014) 
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A
E
 Average  
DMNEs  
(n=179) 
M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M Rank s 
1.1 Observe laws 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.80 1.00 0.94 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.83 0.97 0.93 0.92 1.00 0.80 0.93 1 0.25 
1.2 
Confidentiality of 
information 
1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.83 0.93 0.86 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.93 1 0.25 
1.3 Conflict of interests 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.92 0.76 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 3 0.29 
1.4 Bribery 0.84 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.60 0.83 0.83 0.76 0.93 0.83 0.56 1.00 0.85 4 0.35 
1.5 Sound accounting  0.89 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.89 0.81 0.80 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.83 0.71 0.92 0.89 0.80 0.83 5 0.38 
1.6 Gifts 0.84 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.60 0.89 0.75 0.75 0.60 0.83 0.75 0.66 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.82 6 0.39 
1.7 
Protection of company 
assets 
0.89 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.78 1.00 0.20 0.89 1.00 0.75 0.20 0.67 0.75 0.76 0.64 0.92 0.89 0.60 0.80 7 0.40 
1.8 Insider information 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.94 0.20 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.20 0.50 0.67 0.59 0.57 1.00 0.78 0.40 0.73 8 0.45 
1.9 
Intellectual property, 
copyright 
0.74 1.00 0.86 0.60 0.89 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.50 0.20 0.67 0.83 0.34 0.57 0.75 0.78 0.40 0.66 9 0.47 
1.10 Fraud, embezzlement 0.58 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.89 0.81 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.20 0.67 0.58 0.38 0.64 0.33 0.56 0.60 0.59 10 0.49 
1.11 Nepotism, favouritism 0.74 1.00 0.57 0.80 0.56 0.81 0.40 0.89 0.50 0.75 0.40 0.67 0.42 0.31 0.71 0.50 0.56 0.20 0.58 11 0.49 
1.12 Don't misrepresent product 0.26 0.40 0.57 0.20 0.56 0.63 0.40 0.33 0.63 0.75 0.40 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.14 0.33 0.67 0.60 0.40 12 0.49 
1.13 Use of electronic media 0.42 0.80 0.14 0.80 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.78 0.80 0.37 13 0.49 
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APPENDIX B: Code Content – Commitments to Society (DMNEs, 2014) 
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U
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 Average 
DMNEs 
(n=179) 
M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M Rank s 
2.1 
Improve quality of life for 
community 
0.74 0.40 0.14 0.60 0.33 0.56 0.20 0.44 0.63 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.55 0.00 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.42 1 0.49 
2.2 Political neutrality 0.63 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.56 0.38 0.40 0.56 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.34 0.00 0.67 0.78 0.40 0.39 2 0.49 
2.3 Respect human rights 0.68 0.20 0.29 0.80 0.11 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.44 0.00 0.31 3 0.46 
2.4 Support national development 0.37 0.00 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.20 0.25 4 0.43 
2.5 
Donations, sponsorship, education 
programs 
0.53 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.38 0.00 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.22 5 0.41 
2.6 Promote employee volunteering 0.32 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.00 0.16 6 0.37 
2.7 Government as stakeholder 0.42 0.40 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.20 0.14 7 0.35 
2.8 Pay taxes timely 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 8 0.34 
2.9 Foster citizenship 0.47 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.00 0.12 9 0.33 
2.10 Recognize the role of the media 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.00 0.06 10 0.23 
2.11 Work with NGOs 0.26 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.04 11 0.21 
2.12 Support democracy 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.04 11 0.19 
2.13 Compensate for damage 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 13 0.11 
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APPENDIX C: Code Content – Ethical Principles (DMNEs, 2014) 
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 Average 
DMNEs 
(n=179) 
M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M Rank s 
3.1 Fairness, impartiality  0.89 1.00 0.86 0.80 0.89 0.81 0.40 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.92 1.00 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.87 1 0.34 
3.2 Honesty, truth 0.84 0.80 0.86 0.80 1.00 0.94 0.40 0.89 1.00 0.75 0.80 0.83 1.00 0.55 0.79 0.83 0.89 0.80 0.81 2 0.39 
3.3 Integrity 0.89 1.00 0.57 0.80 0.78 0.94 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.60 0.67 1.00 0.31 0.64 0.92 0.67 0.80 0.73 3 0.44 
3.4 Empathy, respect 0.95 0.80 0.43 1.00 0.89 0.75 0.00 0.78 0.88 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.83 0.79 0.21 0.75 0.78 0.60 0.70 4 0.46 
3.5 Professional standards  0.89 0.80 0.86 0.40 0.78 0.88 0.40 1.00 0.88 0.75 1.00 0.67 0.58 0.48 0.29 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.70 4 0.46 
3.6 Equity, equality, justice 0.89 0.80 0.29 0.60 0.67 0.75 0.20 0.78 0.50 0.00 0.40 0.33 0.75 0.79 0.50 0.83 0.89 0.60 0.67 6 0.47 
3.7 Transparency, openness 0.95 0.80 0.29 0.80 0.22 0.81 0.40 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.40 0.17 0.42 0.86 0.50 0.67 0.56 0.60 0.65 7 0.48 
3.8 Trust 0.68 1.00 0.43 0.60 0.78 0.44 0.20 0.67 0.50 0.25 0.40 0.17 0.75 0.76 0.36 0.67 0.56 0.40 0.58 8 0.49 
3.9 Care, diligence, prudence 0.63 0.20 0.71 0.80 0.44 0.50 0.20 0.89 0.38 0.50 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.24 0.36 0.50 0.44 0.40 0.46 9 0.50 
3.10 Efficiency, cost conscious 0.74 0.40 0.43 0.80 0.11 0.44 0.20 0.67 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.59 0.21 0.75 0.33 0.20 0.45 10 0.50 
3.11 Teamwork, cooperation 0.84 0.60 0.57 0.20 0.33 0.19 0.00 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.20 0.17 0.50 0.41 0.14 0.42 0.56 0.40 0.44 11 0.50 
3.12 Dignity 0.63 0.40 0.29 1.00 0.44 0.56 0.00 0.33 0.63 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.50 0.52 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.00 0.40 12 0.49 
3.13 Excellence 0.53 0.60 0.43 0.20 0.44 0.56 0.20 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.14 0.00 0.67 0.11 0.20 0.36 13 0.48 
3.14 Dialogue, open communication 0.63 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.56 0.63 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.33 0.48 0.14 0.08 0.78 0.00 0.35 14 0.48 
3.15 Loyalty, devotion 0.42 0.20 0.29 0.80 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.56 0.63 0.75 0.20 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.29 0.08 0.33 0.40 0.25 15 0.44 
3.16 Accountability 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.38 0.00 0.33 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.21 0.58 0.22 0.20 0.23 16 0.42 
3.17 Confidence, be upright 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.56 0.13 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.33 0.45 0.07 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.23 16 0.42 
3.18 Consistency 0.47 0.20 0.14 0.40 0.11 0.25 0.20 0.44 0.13 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.44 0.40 0.21 18 0.41 
3.19 Keep promises 0.05 0.00 0.43 0.40 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.33 0.31 0.07 0.08 0.33 0.00 0.17 19 0.38 
3.20 Reliability 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.33 0.44 0.40 0.17 19 0.37 
3.21 Harmony 0.21 0.20 0.71 0.00 0.22 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.17 19 0.38 
 
52 
 
  52 
APPENDIX D: Code Content – Country-Level Patterns (Averages for Country Subsamples, 18 Developing Countries, 2014) 
  
B
ra
zi
l 
C
h
il
e 
C
h
in
a
 
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
 
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
 
In
d
ia
 
In
d
o
n
es
ia
 
M
a
la
y
si
a
 
M
ex
ic
o
 
P
h
il
ip
p
in
es
 
S
a
u
d
i 
A
ra
b
ia
 
S
in
g
a
p
o
re
 
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 
S
o
u
th
 K
o
re
a
 
T
a
iw
a
n
 
T
h
a
il
a
n
d
 
T
u
rk
ey
 
U
A
E
 
(n=19
) 
(n=5) 
(n=7
) 
(n=5
) 
(n=9) 
(n=16
) 
(n=5
) 
(n=9) (n=8) 
(n=4
) 
(n=5) (n=6) 
(n=12
) 
(n=29
) 
(n=14
) 
(n=12
) 
(n=9) (n=5) 
GDP per capita (PPP, 2014) 
11,20
8 
15,73
2 
6,80
7 
7,83
1 
38,12
4 
1,499 
3,47
5 
10,53
8 
10,30
7 
2,76
5 
25,96
2 
55,18
3 
6,618 
25,97
7 
37,71
6 
5,779 
10,97
1 
43,04
9 
Quality of Institutions 3.47 4.82 4.22 3.32 5.63 3.84 4.11 5.11 3.40 3.86 4.97 5.98 4.50 3.70 4.84 3.66 3.90 5.69 
Macroeconomic 
Environment 
4.49 5.88 6.41 5.65 6.17 4.22 5.48 5.26 5.04 5.76 6.67 6.13 4.45 6.44 5.83 6.01 4.83 6.63 
Labour Market Efficiency 3.83 4.36 4.55 4.08 5.57 3.81 3.81 4.80 3.71 4.03 4.25 5.69 3.8 4.07 4.59 4.24 3.48 5.14 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
      
 
Average Coverage per Category   
 
  
  
      
 
Controversial behaviour 0.75 0.91 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.88 0.42 0.88 0.78 0.69 0.43 0.71 0.69 0.60 0.64 0.72 0.80 0.69 
Society 0.39 0.15 0.08 0.23 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.15 0.25 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.21 0.03 0.25 0.25 0.09 
Ethical principles 0.61 0.48 0.41 0.52 0.44 0.49 0.15 0.59 0.56 0.42 0.34 0.24 0.51 0.44 0.28 0.50 0.51 0.38 
Total Sample 0.58 0.51 0.43 0.52 0.47 0.52 0.20 0.55 0.53 0.39 0.26 0.30 0.44 0.42 0.31 0.49 0.52 0.39 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
      
 
Average Coverage per Category (ranked)   
 
  
  
      
 
Controversial behaviour 9 1 5 5 4 2 18 2 8 12 17 11 12 16 15 10 7 12 
Society 1 8 13 5 10 6 14 8 2 15 18 17 11 6 16 2 2 11 
Ethical principles 1 9 13 4 10 8 18 2 3 12 15 17 5 10 16 7 5 14 
Total Sample 1 7 11 4 9 4 18 2 3 13 17 16 10 12 15 8 4 13 
 
